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ABSTRACT: Avian influenza is a contagious viral disease, affecting several species of birds, and poses a significant 
public threat. During 2016-2017, there were 2,224 high pathogenic avian influenza outbreaks in Europe, which led to 
the destruction of 9,663,770 birds, and 72 low pathogenic avian influenza outbreaks in 5 European countries, which 
caused 276,584 bird fatalities. The majority of the epidemics were in wild and backyard birds, except for France and 
Hungary, where the majority of outbreaks were in duck-goose farms. Notably, there were a total of 100 outbreaks in 
turkey farms and 37 outbreaks in layer farms, while in broiler farms there were only 10. It is indisputable that wild 
birds are natural hosts and reservoirs for all types of avian influenza viruses. However, the role of poultry farms on 
the AI intra-country epidemiology has not been fully clarified. Based on the official reports of OIE for AI, this study 
indicates that poultry farms, especially fattening turkey and layer chicken farms, are high-risk factors concerning the 
introduction of the disease into an area and its spread into other poultry farms.
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INTRODUCTION
Avian influenza (AI) is an infectious viral disease of substantial importance, due to the virus’ rapid 
spread and high mortality rates in poultry flocks and 
its possible transmission to mammals, including hu-
mans, usually following close contact with infected 
poultry. During the last century, viruses originated, ei-
ther entirely or partly, from avian influenza A viruses, 
caused most of the human influenza pandemics (Acha 
and Szyfres, 2003, Fouchier and Munster, 2009, Ku-
chipudi et al., 2014). 
Besides, AI has a tremendous economic impact, 
due to trading restrictions and embargoes imposed 
on infected areas or countries. The control measures, 
which are enforced by legislation in the European 
Union as well as in other countries worldwide, usually 
involve the implementation of stamping-out policies 
with defined restriction zones and severe trade impli-
cations (Aldous et al., 2010). The cost of 2016-2017 
AI epizootic in Europe is immense, although difficult 
to be estimated. The last devastating AI epizootic in 
the USA had a dramatic impact on the country’s poul-
try sector, in both economic terms and the number of 
birds’ losses. In particular, the cost was estimated to 
1.3 billion American dollars and resulted in the death 
of more than 50 million birds, either by cause of the 
disease itself or after the stamping-out policy (Ramos 
et al., 2017). Two main global pandemics character-
ize the epizootiology of AI in the 21st century. Nota-
bly, the first epizootic started in 2004 and concluded 
in 2012, peaking in 2006, while the second was ob-
served in 2013 and concluded recently (OIE Situation 
Report, 2018).
Most avian influenza viruses (AIVs) cause only 
mild disease in poultry and are called low pathogenic 
avian influenza viruses (LPAIVs). Highly pathogen-
ic avian influenza viruses (HPAIVs) evolve from H5 
and H7 LPAI viruses after their introduction and cir-
culation in poultry flocks. HPAI viruses can kill up to 
90-100% of the flock, and cause epizootics that may 
spread rapidly, devastate the poultry industry and re-
sult in severe trade restrictions (OIE Avian Influenza 
Review, 2016).
It is well known that wild birds are the main ve-
hicle for AIVs long distance spread, such as between 
countries since they are natural hosts and reservoirs 
for all types of avian influenza viruses (Fouchier and 
Munster, 2009, Hill and Runstadler, 2016). Howev-
er, the intra-country AI epidemiology and the role of 
poultry farms have not been fully clarified. Therefore, 
the objective of this study is to highlight the role of 
poultry farms and wild birds during the 2016-2017 AI 
epizootic in Europe as well as to estimate the number 
of bird losses per country and totally in Europe.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
This study registers and categorizes AI outbreaks 
in several European countries, based on the official 
reports of epidemiological data submitted by those 
countries to the World Organisation for Animal 
Health (OIE) between January 1, 2016, and Decem-
ber 11, 2017. The data from each country were sum-
marized and classified according to birds’ species, 
farming system, number of outbreaks and number of 
destroyed birds. The study is in full compliance with 
all relevant codes of experimentation and legislation.
RESULTS
During this period, there were 2,224 HPAI out-
breaks in 29 European countries, which led to the 
death of 9,986,136 birds, as a result of either disease 
mortality or stamping-out measures (Table 1). The 
top 10 countries, in terms of bird losses, were Italy, 
Hungary, France, Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, Swe-
den, The Netherlands, UK and Czech Republic. The 
top 10 countries, in terms of the number of outbreaks, 
were France, Hungary, Germany, Romania, Poland, 
Italy, Switzerland, Bulgaria, Czech Republic and The 
Netherlands.
The majority of the outbreaks were in wild and 
backyard birds, except France and Hungary, where 
the outbreaks were mostly observed in duck-goose 
farms. It is worth mentioning that among 10 Euro-
pean countries whose reports came from farms of 
Galliformes birds, there were 100 HPAI outbreaks in 
fattening turkey farms and 37 in layer farms, while in 
broiler farms there were only 10 outbreaks, closely 
related to turkey and/or duck-goose farms. More spe-
cifically, in Italy, there were 40 HPAI outbreaks in tur-
key farms, 16 in layer farms and 4 in broiler farms in 
a total of 60 HPAI outbreaks. In Germany, there were 
49 HPAI outbreaks in turkey farms, 4 in layer farms, 
2 in turkey breeder farms and 1 in a breeder farm in 
a total of 56 HPAI outbreaks. In France, there were 6 
HPAI outbreaks in layer farms, 5 in broiler farms, 2 in 
breeder farms and 1 in a turkey farm, while there were 
34 outbreaks in birds’ farms, as the breeding category 
in the reports was unclear, in a total of 48 HPAI out-
breaks. In Hungary, there were 6 HPAI outbreaks in 
turkey farms, 4 in layer farms and 1 in a broiler farm 
in a total of 11 HPAI outbreaks. In Τhe Netherlands, 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/08/2021 05:31:47 |
J HELLENIC VET MED SOC 2021, 72(2)
ΠΕΚΕ 2021, 72(2)
2919V. TSIOURIS, N. MAVROMATI, T. MANTZIOS, K. KISKINIS, E. SOSSIDOU, I. GEORGOPOULOU
there were 3 HPAI outbreaks in layer farms and 2 in 
breeder farms in a total of 5 HPAI outbreaks. In the 
UK, there were 3 HPAI outbreaks in turkey farms and 
1 in a breeder farm, in a total of 4 HPAI outbreaks. 
In Sweden, there were a total of 2 HPAI outbreaks in 
layer farms. Finally, in Greece and Luxemburg, there 
was one reported HPAI outbreak in a layer farm, and 
in Austria in a turkey farm. Overall, regarding HPAI 
outbreaks of Galliformes, 52.91% were in turkey 
farms, 19.58% in layer farms, 5.29% in broiler farms, 
3.17% in broiler breeder farms and 1.06% in turkey 
breeder farms.
























France 5 6 2 1 0 358 16 19 55 56 556 1,413,897
Hungary 1 4 0 6 0 195 30 0 67 3 308 1,972,341
Germany 0 4 1 49 2 11 19 6 200 0 292 1,192,215
Romania 0 0 0 0 0 0 46 0 90 0 136 1,452
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 0 71 39 135 1,008,896
Italy 4 16 0 40 0 5 15 3 14 0 99 2,803,589
Switzerland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 94 0 94 0
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 0 14 43 77 582,188
Czech Rep. 0 0 0 0 0 3 33 2 34 0 72 74,928
Netherlands 0 3 2 0 0 5 0 0 59 0 69 230,049
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 60 0 69 210
Denmark 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 51 0 53 69
Sweden 0 2 0 0 0 0 3 1 37 0 43 258,894
Austria 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 33 0 34 21
UK 0 0 1 3 0 0 5 2 19 0 32 106,603
Serbia 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 21 0 25 243
Croatia 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 11 3 22 492
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21 0 21 0
Belgium 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 13 18 4,861
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 16 0 17 29
Greece 0 1 0 0 0 0 5 0 9 0 15 81
Spain 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 9 12 9,880
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 0 9 2
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 5 0
Luxemburg 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 4 787
Bosnia and 




0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 1,992
Cyprus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
Total 10 37 6 100 2 578 240 38 1,002 166 2,224 9,663,770
Total % 0.45 1.66 0.27 4.5 0.09 25.99 10.79 1.71 45.05 7.46 100
Source: OIE, Immediate notifications and follow-up reports of highly pathogenic avian influenza
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Table 2. LPAI outbreaks in poultry farms, backyard flocks and wild birds in affected European countries during 2016-2017 Avian 
Influenza Epizootic.




















Germany H5N1, H5N2, H5N3 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 1 0 0 8 3,009
The 





0 0 1 0 2 40 0 1 0 13 58 126,216
Denmark H5N2, H7N7 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 4,416
UK H5N1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 39,800
Total 0 0 1 0 2 44 5 2 0 17 72 276,584
Source: OIE, Immediate notifications and follow-up reports of low pathogenic avian influenza
The dominant HPAI virus subtype in Europe 
during the 2016-2017 epizootic was H5N8. Neverthe-
less, other AI subtypes were also observed during that 
period. The H5N5 subtype was detected in Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, The Netherlands, 
Serbia and Slovenia in wild birds and fattening turkey 
farms. H5N9, H5N1 and H5N2 subtypes were iden-
tified in France, in duck/goose farms, broiler farms, 
guinea fowl farm, multi-species farm and a hatchery. 
The H5N6 subtype was detected in a backyard farm in 
Greece and The Netherlands, in two outbreaks in wild 
birds, while the H7N7 subtype was found in Italy, in a 
turkey and a layer farm.
During the same period, there were also 72 LPAI 
outbreaks in 5 European countries, which led to the 
death of 277,752 birds (Table 2). France was the 
country with the highest number of birds’ losses, 
followed by The Netherlands, UK, Denmark, and 
Germany. Regarding the number of LPAI outbreaks, 
France was the country with the highest number, list-
ing 58, followed by Germany with 8 outbreaks, The 
Netherlands with 3, Denmark with 2 outbreaks and 
the UK with 1 outbreak. The majority of LPAI out-
breaks were reported in duck-goose farms (44/72 out-
breaks). In breeder and turkey breeder farms were ob-
served only 3 LPAI outbreaks, in France while there 
were no outbreaks in broiler, layer and turkey farms. 
The dominant LPAI virus subtype in Germany, The 
Netherlands, France, and Denmark was H5N2, which 
was responsible for the death of 96,598 birds in back-
yard, breeder, duck-goose farms and game bird farms. 
The H5N1 subtype was responsible for the death of 
96,349 birds of duck-goose farms and multi-species 
farms in the UK, France, and Germany. The H5N3 
subtype was the cause of death of 17,921 birds in 
backyard, turkey breeder and duck-goose farms in 
Germany and France. Besides, France was the only 
country where the H5N8 and H5N9 subtypes of LPAI 
virus were detected in duck-goose farms. Similar-
ly, The Netherlands was the only country where the 
H7N9 subtype was observed, but the affected popula-
tion was not identified.
DISCUSSION
AIVs pose significant threats to avian and human 
health and cause severe damage to the poultry indus-
try, concerning mortality, welfare, economic losses, 
and trading restrictions (Kuchipudi et al., 2014, Ra-
mos et al. 2017). Wild birds, and especially those 
belonging to the orders Anseriformes (for instance 
waterfowl, ducks, geese, swans) and Charadriiformes 
(gulls, terns and shorebirds), are considered the nat-
ural reservoir hosts of the AIVs (Acha and Szyfres, 
2003, Swayne, 2006). The findings of our study fully 
support the above mentioned results since the major-
ity of infected wild birds during the 2016-2017 AI 
epizootic in Europe were ducks, geese, swans, gulls, 
terns and shorebirds.
Migratory birds, during their long migratory jour-
neys, exchange viruses with other populations at stag-
ing, stopover, or wintering sites (Georgopoulou and 
Tsiouris, 2008, Gill et al., 2009). Shorebirds and gulls 
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contribute more to the AI transmission over more ex-
tensive geographic distances than ducks and geese. In 
particular, gulls and shorebirds play a crucial role in 
linking the continents, as they undertake long-distance 
migration, and allow a more direct route of virus trans-
mission (Gill et al., 2009, Hill and Runstadler, 2016). 
In contrast, waterfowl are non-migratory birds, which 
fly and reside over land, stop at wetlands for food and 
supply, thus contributing to interspecies transmission 
and spread of AIV on the inside (Miller et al., 2005, 
Gill et al., 2009, Hill and Runstadler, 2016).
Based on the official reports of OIE during 2016-
2017 AI epizootic, there were 72 outbreaks of LPAI 
viruses, the majority of which prevailed in duck-
goose farms in France. H5N2 was the dominant LPAI 
virus subtype of the epizootic, while other subtypes, 
such as H5N1, H5N3, H5N8-H5N9, H7N7 and H7N9 
were reported as well. In cases of LPAI viruses trans-
mission from wild birds to poultry, there are three sce-
narios. The first scenario, the most common among 
the three, is the termination of the viruses’ circulation. 
The second is the preservation of the viruses’ circula-
tion. Finally, the third scenario is the evolution of the 
viruses into HPAI, such as H5 or H7. However, once 
an AIV has been transmitted and efficiently circulated 
to poultry, it can rarely be re-adapted in wild birds 
(Swayne, 2006).
HPAI and LPAI viruses have been frequently iso-
lated in commercial poultry farms of chickens, tur-
keys, ducks, geese, and ratites, as well as in pigeons 
and cage birds. However, the sensitivity and the 
clinical manifestation of the disease in birds vary be-
tween avian species. For example, pigeons appear to 
be relatively resistant to infection compared to poul-
try (Swayne, 2006). Similarly, the high mortality in 
chickens and simultaneously the absence of clinical 
disease in ducks after AIV challenge, indicate that 
there are differences in the innate immune response 
among avian species (Kuchipudi et al., 2014).
An interesting observation during the 2016-2017 
AI epizootic, according to the official reports of the 
World Organization for Animal Health, was the type 
of Galliformes farms which were mostly affected by 
HPAI viruses. In particular, 52.91% of the outbreaks 
occurred in turkey farms, 19.58% in layer farms, 
5.29% in broiler farms, 3.17% in breeder farms and 
1.06% in turkey breeder farms.
Regarding that, the higher sensitivity of fattening 
turkeys to AI compared to that of broiler chicks could 
be the reason for the higher prevalence of AI out-
breaks in turkey farms (Aldous et al., 2010). In partic-
ular, turkeys were 10-fold more susceptible to infec-
tion than chickens, with the cases concerning turkey 
farms being 4.5% of the total cases, while in broiler 
farms the rate was 0.45%. Likewise, turkeys are be-
ing raised for a more extended productivity period 
and under less strict biosecurity measures since occa-
sionally they have outdoor access, e.g. for scratching 
and grazing. Similarly, layer hens are being raised for 
even more than a year productive period, and biose-
curity gaps are more frequent since layer farms have 
more visits (egg transports, feed) and equipment ex-
change (egg trays, egg trolleys, egg tray crates), thus 
the infestation degree concerning layer farms equals 
1.66%. These management practices increase the risk 
of contact with both wild birds and mechanical carri-
ers and contribute to the higher prevalence of AI out-
breaks in turkey and layer farms. Taking all the above 
into account, we could conclude that turkey and layer 
farms constitute a critical risk factor for the introduc-
tion of the disease into an area and its spread into oth-
er poultry farms.
Additionally, according to the official reports of 
OIE during 2016-2017, the majority of AI outbreaks 
were in duck-goose farms. The main reason for that 
higher prevalence is probably the outdoor farming 
system and the notably direct contact of them with 
the wild birds. Furthermore, the relative resistance of 
these species to AIV infections could lead to the shed-
ding of large amounts of the virus to the environment 
and the spread of the disease to the other birds of the 
farm (Kuchipudi et al., 2014).
During the conduction of the present investigation, 
it became clear that OIE is keeping and recording a 
very detailed file regarding animal diseases, and that 
cannot be accomplished without the close collabora-
tion of every country. It is obvious that evaluating the 
exact size of an endangered population is not always 
easy to determine, and every so often even the type 
of the epidemiological unit itself. This kind of work 
seems to be even more difficult amid a pandemic, es-
pecially in the case of a disease such as AI, whose 
spread can occur rapidly and dramatically. That can 
be seen quite clearly in the reports of countries such 
as Poland and Bulgaria that reported a large number 
of “unidentified cases”. Likewise, France reported 
both a substantial amount of unidentified cases and 
plenty of outbreaks in birds’ farms, without the speci-
fication of the breeding system. In this way, the study 
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and statistical processing of the results is made dif-
ficult, as the data from the reports seem incomplete, 
mainly regarding the bird species, thus not allowing 
a more thorough epidemiological investigation of the 
outbreaks.
The majority of the OIE reports claimed that the 
AIV infection was a result of contact, direct or indi-
rect, between wild birds and poultry (OIE Situation 
Report, 2017). In particular, outbreaks linked to the 
dominant H5N8 subtype in Europe indicated that the 
sources of the infection were the contact with wild 
species or with infected animals when grazing or wa-
tering, through fomites (such as humans, vehicles, 
feed), the introduction of new live animals, via air-
borne spread, and, finally, via unknown or inconclu-
sive routes. Genetic analyses of the European viruses 
indicate that they were introduced via wild birds to 
northern and central Europe from Asia (El-Shesheny 
et al., 2017).
According to another OIE Situation Report for avi-
an influenza, published on 18/09/2017, HPAI H5N8 
caused 277 outbreaks in poultry, 51 in wild birds and 
led to the destruction of 427,081 poultry. HPAI H5N8 
subtype is a complex reassortant virus carrying genes 
from A (H5N1) as one of its parental viruses. It was 
firstly reported in China in 2010, while later on, fol-
lowing further virus evolution via reassortment, sev-
eral outbreaks with HPAI virus A (H5N8) viruses oc-
curred in aquatic migratory birds, chicken, geese and 
ducks in China, Japan, Republic of Korea and Europe 
(Hill et al., 2015, El-Shesheny et al., 2017). The HPAI 
virus A (H5N8) virus pathogenicity varies among avi-
an species. Particularly, during infection, mass mor-
tality is observed in turkeys and chickens, while it has 
yet to be correlated with acute illness or excessive 
mortality rates in mallards (Adlhoch et al., 2014). The 
transmission of avian influenza A(H5N8) virus to hu-
mans has not been reported so far worldwide, and no 
human cases have been reported (Brown et al., 2017).
The epidemiologic investigation of outbreaks 
linked to the H5N1-H5N2 subtypes in France claimed 
that the source of infection either was the introduc-
tion of new live animals or was unknown/inconclu-
sive. Based on the OIE reports on AI in 2017, the 
HPAI H5N1 is enzootic in Asia and Africa and causes 
outbreaks in poultry and sporadic human infections. 
Since wild birds are most frequently implicated in the 
transmission, all affected countries should focus on 
applying biosecurity measures and on avoiding con-
tact of wild birds with poultry. HPAI H5N1 led to 17 
ongoing worldwide outbreaks in poultry and the de-
struction of 131,168 birds, whereas HPAI H5N2 led 
to 182 ongoing outbreaks in poultry and 1 in wild 
birds and therefore led to the destruction of 1,617,816 
birds (OIE Situation Report, 2017).
Greece and The Netherlands were the only Euro-
pean countries to be reported with the H5N6 subtype 
of AIV. However, this subtype is considered the re-
sult of genetic reassortment from the H5N8 Europe-
an subtype (OIE Update on Avian Influenza, 2018). 
H5N6 affected three countries worldwide and caused 
358 outbreaks in poultry. The data shows that it has 
outnumbered the H5N8 AIV, concerning the amount 
of poultry destroyed after the application of control 
measures by the veterinary authorities (25,096,648 
birds). The Asian lineage H5N6 causes severe clinical 
signs in poultry and associated mortality. Migratory 
birds could be the vectors of HPAI H5N6 transmis-
sion outside Asia. According to reports of WHO since 
2014, this group of H5N6 viruses has been related to 
24 laboratory-confirmed outbreaks of human infec-
tion, including 7 deaths in China (WHO, 2020).
The Netherlands was the only European country 
where outbreaks associated with H7N9 AIV, which 
were detected in ducks and neighboring broiler farms. 
Although the source of the infection was unknown 
or inconclusive, OIE stands by the fact that live bird 
markets pose a significant risk factor for H7N9 virus 
spreading among poultry and from poultry to humans. 
This virus, based on phylogenetic analysis, is not the 
same as the China H7N9 virus that has a significant 
impact on poultry and human infections in Asia. Since 
its origin in 2013, the H7N9 virus remained LPAI in 
poultry mainly in China but caused over 1,562 human 
infections (as of September 13, 2017). However, OIE 
reported recently that the LPAI H7N9 virus has mu-
tated to an HPAI H7N9 virus. According to OIE Sit-
uation Report for Avian Influenza on 18/09/2017, the 
H7N9 virus is the cause of 22 additional worldwide 
outbreaks and led to the destruction of 831,087 birds.
Finally, yet importantly, the H5N5 virus affected 
several European countries. The source of the infec-
tion was either the contact with wild species or un-
known/inconclusive. According to the OIE update 
on AI in 2018, H5N5 AIV affected only 2 countries 
worldwide and is the cause of 2 ongoing outbreaks 
concerning wild birds. There were no outbreaks in 
poultry, and no poultry was destroyed due to the con-
trol measures.
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CONCLUSION
Poultry farms play a crucial role in the spread of 
AI into an area, although wild birds are known to be 
the source for the infection of domestic poultry and 
humans. The introduction of AI in poultry farms leads 
to severe damages and trade restrictions, which have a 
global impact on the market. Therefore, it is of grand 
necessity to eliminate the exposure of poultry to wild 
birds through a plethora of preventive measures, such 
as strict biosecurity measures and rearing restrictions. 
Still, the particular type of poultry farms should be 
considered for the implementation of biosecurity pro-
tocols, since fattening turkey and layer chicken farms 
pose a crucial risk factor for an AI outbreak. The es-
tablishment and application of surveillance systems, 
diagnostic methods for early detection of AIV and 
harmonized restriction and control measures are only 
some fundamental actions that need to be adminis-
tered to restrain the distribution, prevalence and in-
troduction pathways into Europe and for the control 
of AI.
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